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Abstract
The likelihood of an automated reasoning program being of substantial assistance
for a wide spectrum of applications rests with the nature of the options and parameters
it offers on which to base needed strategies and methodologies. This article focuses
on such a spectrum, featuring W. McCune’s program OTTER, discussing widely var-
ied successes in answering open questions, and touching on some of the strategies and
methodologies that played a key role. The applications include finding a first proof,
discovering single axioms, locating improved axiom systems, and simplifying existing
proofs. The last application is directly pertinent to the recently found (by R. Thiele)
Hilbert’s twenty-fourth problem—which is extremely amenable to attack with the ap-
propriate automated reasoning program—a problem concerned with proof simplifica-
tion. The methodologies include those for seeking shorter proofs and for finding proofs
that avoid unwanted lemmas or classes of term, a specific option for seeking proofs with
smaller equational or formula complexity, and a different option to address the variable
richness of a proof. The type of proof one obtains with the use of OTTER is Hilbert-
style axiomatic, including details that permit one sometimes to gain new insights. We
include questions still open and challenges that merit consideration.
1 Background and Perspective
In this article, we make a strong case for the use in diverse applications of an automated
reasoning program by mathematicians and logicians. The basis consists of brief discussions
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(in Section 3) of successes in answering open questions from unrelated fields and of finding
missing proofs of various types. (Numerous missing proofs and input files will be offered
in the forthcoming book entitled Automated Reasoning and the Discovery of Missing and
Elegant Proofs by L. Wos and B. Fitelson.) In this section, we set the stage for presenting
what can be accomplished with McCune’s automated reasoning program. (For a detailed
treatment of automated reasoning, see [Wos1999].) Especially for those not familiar with
this program or, more generally, with the field, we provide in this section a somewhat
detailed example of how a first and significant proof was discovered.
Perhaps the most difficult task for a mathematician or logician, and yet clearly intrigu-
ing and pleasurable, is that of proof finding. Precisely how such a researcher completes
proofs remains a mystery. What is clear is that various proofs sometimes are missing for
many decades, as was the case with the proof that every Robbins algebra is a Boolean al-
gebra (proved by W. McCune with his automated reasoning program EQP [McCune1997]).
Proofs take many forms, including those by induction, those relying on some very
powerful result such as Zorn’s lemma or the well-ordering principle, those that are purely
first-order and axiomatic in the style of Hilbert, and those proofs by contradiction. Our
preference is for Hilbert-style axiomatic proofs that are purely first-order and that complete
by detecting a contradiction. In our view, compared with other types of proof, such an
axiomatic proof is more likely to provide new insights and is far more instructive in general.
Indeed, one can learn from such a proof.
We preferred such proofs even as early as the mid-1950s when in the mathematics
department at the University of Chicago, and we still do. Therefore, our fascination with
automated reasoning and the proofs discovered by McCune’s program OTTER comes as no
surprise. This article cites (in Section 3) such proofs with little detail, proofs that answer
diverse open questions taken from a variety of fields of mathematics and logic.
The type of attack OTTER applies in general differs sharply from that of the typical
unaided researcher; no attempt is made to emulate some master of some field. Instead, when
a deep question or hard problem is under consideration, the program ordinarily accrues a
vast amount of new conclusions with the objective of finding among them a contradiction.
On the other hand, the program does not undertake a study on its own. Rather, especially
in our research, a form of advice is usually given and (one hopes) wise choices are made for
the options used and effective choices are made for the values assigned to the parameters.
The following example illustrates to a small extent how we attack a problem, how we search
for a missing proof.
The theorem of concern, actually the proof, focuses on two-valued sentential (or propo-
sitional) calculus. Whereas the Robbins problem featured three equations and asked whether
they provided an axiomatization of Boolean algebra, the focus here is on a single formula
(not relying on equality) and the assertion that it does provide an axiomatization for propo-
sitional calculus. Specifically, in the mid-1930s, J.  Lukasiewicz offered without proof the
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following 23-letter formula, where the function i denotes implication and the function n
negation, and noted that it sufficed for the study of the cited area of logic [ Lukasiewicz1970].
i(i(i(x,y),i(i(i(n(z),n(u)),v),z)),i(w,i(i(z,x),i(u,x))))
Our consultations with colleagues strongly suggested that a proof of this fact had never
been published. In other words, sharing with the Robbins problem, a proof was missing.
Our goal was to find such a proof, a proof that showed the  Lukasiewicz 23-letter formula
to be a single axiom for propositional calculus. Also similar to the Robbins problem, one
was evidently free to choose the target for the desired proof.
In contrast to a conjecture, we were certain that a proof had existed; after all,  Lukasiewicz
was a master. The question remained regarding what target he had in mind. We chose as
target his three-axiom system [ Lukasiewicz1970], the following.
i(i(x,y),i(i(y,z),i(x,z)))
i(i(n(x),x),x)
i(x,i(n(x),y))
As noted earlier, we usually give OTTER suggestions for an attack. One way for the
researcher to do this is to include an appropriate list equations or formulas that the re-
searcher considers attractive because of their shape. The variables of such included items,
called resonators [Wos1995], are treated as indistinguishable, thus making their functional
shape the key. To each resonator, one assigns a value to reflect the conjectured importance
of the pattern: the lower the value, the higher the priority given to any deduced conclusion
that matches the corresponding resonator. To direct its reasoning, the program can be
instructed to choose from among its database of conclusions that which has the highest pri-
ority. Perhaps influenced by our choice of target (the  Lukasiewicz three-axiom system), we
included sixty-eight resonators, each corresponding to a thesis (theorem) that  Lukasiewicz
had included in his publications [ Lukasiewicz1970]. We assigned to each a very small value
to give any deduced conclusion matching one of the sixty-eight resonators a priority (higher
than any other conclusion) for initiating the application of an inference rule.
The second important aspect of our methodology was that of temporary lemma adjunc-
tion [Wos2001a]. The lemmas to be adjoined, if proved, were from among the sixty-eight
theses. Those that were proved in one run were adjoined in the initial set of support for
the next run. The style of the methodology was interactive.
The third aspect of the methodology concerned the inclusion in later runs of resonators
corresponding to proof steps of lemmas proved in earlier runs. In addition to proved lemmas
among the cited sixty-eight, proof steps of any of the target axioms were included (in the
initial set of support) if proved. As it turned out, the third of the three  Lukasiewicz axioms
was proved in an early run and the second proved in the next run.
3
The final aspect—and one that we conjecture enabled the program to succeed—was
most counterintuitive, if one examines the literature. Specifically, for all runs we instructed
the program to avoid retention of any conclusion that contained a double-negation term,
a term of the form n(n(t)) for any term t. That decision was motivated by three factors.
First, for many years such prohibition had proved to be most effective in proof finding with
OTTER. Second, we were curious about the possible existence of a double-negation-free
proof of this marvelous theorem. Third, we had come to believe that the density of proofs
within the space of double-negation-free conclusions was far greater than in the entire space
of conclusions.
Of course, consistent with our preference for remaining strictly within the theory under
study, we excluded any mention of equality and confined the inference-rule mechanism to
condensed detachment. A glance at the work of various masters shows that, in cases of
the type under discussion, equality is sometimes brought into the picture. Our goal was to
complete a proof relying solely on condensed detachment, conjecturing that such a proof in
general provides more insight and is often easier to follow.
In three runs, OTTER produced a proof of the three-axiom system of  Lukasiewicz.
Because that proof relied upon various lemmas adjoined during the process, it was not
quite what we were after. Indeed, the proof produced in the third run nicely established
that the goal was reachable. Therefore, in the fourth run, all temporarily adjoined lemmas
were removed. Two sets of resonators were included, one corresponding to the key proof
found in the third experiment and one corresponding to proof steps of lemmas from among
the sixty-eight not proved in earlier runs.
In contrast to the third experiment’s heavy use of CPU time, the fourth experiment
quickly completed, yielding a 200-step proof [Wos2001a]. Its length and its nature (free of
double negation) almost certainly guarantee that the original and unpublished and unavail-
able  Lukasiewicz proof was in no way similar to that produced by OTTER—we shall never
be able to make that interesting comparison. Few if any would enjoy a close examination
of a 200-step proof. Besides, pertinent to the Hilbert twenty-fourth problem, a vigorous
attempt was in order to find a far, far shorter proof. We therefore undertook the needed
investigation. More than one year of not continuous study witnessed progress—a 50-step
proof was discovered [Wos2002]. We offer as a challenge the finding (if such exists) of a
proof of length strictly less than fifty. We place no constraint on the target; in particular,
the  Lukasiewicz three-axiom system need not be the choice.
2 Solvable Problem Classes
Two factors explain the content of this section, namely, the sampling of some of the types
of problem that are amenable to attack with OTTER. First, we wish to inform the various
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researchers about what can be accomplished, the diversity that is accessible. Second, we
continue to seek open questions, hard problems, and proofs that merit refinement. There-
fore, a discussion of the types of problem that can be attacked is in order; we seek problems
in one or more of the classes we discuss in this section. To further clarify the type of prob-
lem most amenable to study with OTTER, we touch on various methodologies this program
supports that have proved quite powerful. Almost always, an assignment is completed by
finding a Hilbert-style axiomatic proof by contradiction. The researcher includes as part of
the input a statement or statements that correspond to assuming the theorem false or the
assignment uncompletable.
To many, the most attractive class of problem concerns finding a first proof, which may
be in the context of settling a conjecture or of producing a proof for a result announced
without proof. The approach we take in such cases generally focuses on searching where no
researcher has gone before. Indeed, at least for conjectures, we do not expect to improve
upon the work of an expert’s exploration of a given terrain. Therefore, we often make coun-
terintuitive moves such as avoiding double negation or avoiding some previously-thought-
to-be crucial lemma. Such avoidance is effected by the use of demodulation, rewriting the
unwanted to junk to be purged, or by means of weighting, assigning the unwanted a com-
plexity that exceeds the assigned value (by the user) for the complexity of newly retained
information.
With or without such counterintuitive moves, the program still provides the basis for
actions that the unaided researcher might find impractical to take. Indeed, one can instruct
OTTER to retain extremely complex conclusions (measured in symbol count) by assigning
the max weight a correspondingly high value. Further, one can instruct the program to focus
on such complex conclusions by simply choosing a breadth-first search, set(sos queue). Most
unlikely is the case in which an unaided researcher would find such a search practical. One
can modify the breadth-first search by mixing it with a complexity-driven search by relying
on McCune’s ratio strategy, which blends the two direction strategies according to the
value assigned to pick given ratio. Also, as in part discussed in Section 1, the researcher
can advise the program about which equational patterns or which formula patterns are
attractive by using the resonance strategy. Many, many additional actions can be taken to
direct the program’s reasoning or to restrict it in search of a first proof or in the attempt
to settle a conjecture. Here we have merely provided a small taste.
Of a related nature is the seeking of single axioms for some area or the seeking of
a preferable axiom system or basis. In such cases, one turns to the same means as cited
for seeking a first proof. One can, however, do as we do when wishing to consider many
combinations of parameter values and option settings. Specifically, we use super-loop,
a program that considers all of the combinations dictated by a user-supplied addendum
to an input file, and we use otter-loop, a program that automatically runs a sequence of
experiments that differ by, for example, blocking the use of one step of a proof after another.
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Problems of axiom dependence are often easily solved with OTTER. Sometimes one
can off-and-on study an area in terms of an axiom system and be unaware that dependencies
exist among its members. One aspect of mathematics and logic focuses on learning about
such dependencies, such as the dependency of the axioms of right identity and of right inverse
in group theory. In the mid-1990s, the logician R. Epstein [Epstein1995] offered an open
question on axiom dependence for a six-axiom system for propositional logic, a question
quickly answered by OTTER. The approach to the study of possible axiom dependence is
straightforward. One places all but one of the members in the initial set of support, places
the negation of the remaining member in the passive list, and seeks a proof. Each member
is successively treated in this manner. Of course, semidecidability comes into play; indeed,
if no proof is found, one cannot be certain that a corresponding dependency does not exist.
This situation does not differ materially from that in which a colleague is asked for a proof
and does not deliver such. When a proof is not forthcoming and doubt begins to grow, one
can turn to some model generation program.
We now turn to open questions of a different type, namely, those concerned with
proof refinement, pertinent to the Hilbert twenty-fourth problem (discovered by R. Thiele
[Thiele2001]). Both the preceding and the following (to me) are captured by the notion
of seeking a missing proof of some type. We have spent almost a decade, on and off,
in the study of proof simplification (refinement) in various contexts, and we experienced
approximately one year ago great satisfaction from Thiele’s discovery and the following
quote from Hilbert: “The twenty-fourth problem in my Paris lecture was to be: Criteria of
simplicity, or proof of the greatest simplicity of certain proofs.”
A proof in hand can be simplified in many respects, and OTTER can provide substantial
assistance in many of them. Ceteris paribus, a reduction in the length of a proof corresponds
to a simplification. A reduction in the variable richness of a proof also contributes to its
simplicity, where the variable richness equals the maximum number of distinct variables
present among the deduced steps. Similarly, a reduction in equational or formula complexity
simplifies a proof, where the complexity measures in symbol count the longest deduced step.
In addition, simplicity is increased when so-called big lemmas are avoided and when various
classes of term (such as double-negation terms) are avoided. Still another aspect of proof
simplification relates to proof size, the total number of symbols present in the deduced
steps, a concept brought to our attention by D. Ulrich. Each of these proof refinements has
its analogue in the study of axiom systems. For but one example, researchers sometimes
pursue the discovery of an axiom system of smaller size than that in hand.
The majority of our research has focused on proof length, for which OTTER offers
a number of methodologies. Rather than detailing the various methodologies, we instead
review the latest approach, in part because it illustrates well what can be accomplished
with OTTER.
Imagine that the goal is to find a shorter proof of the conjunction of A,B, and C and
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that one has in hand a proof of said conjunction. Next, let the proof of C be the longest of
the three subproofs respectively of A, B, and C. Note the important fact that the goal of
finding a shorter proof of the conjunction makes no demand on finding shorter proofs of any
of the three members. A strategy called cramming [Wos2001b] has proved quite powerful in
this context, sometimes producing the desired shorter proof and at the same time relying
on longer subproofs of one or more members of the conjunction.
The basic idea is to take the proof of C and cram as many of its steps into the other
two needed proofs as possible to thus require very, very few additional steps to reach the
goal. In the ideal case, the subproof of C in hand is such that but two additional steps
are required, one to deduce A, and one to deduce B. In other words, the proof of C offers
all of the needed parents that permit an application of an inference rule in use to yield A
and another set to yield B. If all goes as planned, the new proof of the conjunction is but
two steps longer than the subproof of C. One can test for this case by using a breadth-first
search, adjoining the proof steps of C to the initial set of support, placing in a hints list (by
relying on R. Veroff’s hints strategy [Veroff2001) A and B, and assigning to max weight a
very small value.
The ideal case has occurred in our research, producing an abridgment of a Meredith-
Prior abridgment [Meredith1963,Wos2001b] for the proof for the  Lukasiewicz shortest single
axiom for the implicational fragment of propositional calculus [ Lukasiewicz1970]. We have
many other successes of using cramming in which the program was allowed more freedom
but still keyed on the longest subproof of the members of the conjunction under study. Other
useful incarnations of cramming have been formulated and successfully applied. Regarding
trading short subproofs for longer ones, in one of those studies (of the ¡C,O¿ calculus
[Meredith1953,Wos2001b], related to propositional calculus), cramming found a shorter
proof (from a single axiom with the target a 2-axiom system) by trading a 10-step subproof
of the second member for a 35-step proof of it.
If, instead of proof length, the simplification of concern is that of equational or formula
complexity, OTTER offers the explicit means for attacking the problem, namely, the use
of max weight. When, say, the proof in hand has complexity k and one seeks a proof of
complexity j with j strictly less than k, one merely assigns j as the value to max weight.
The program will then retain no new conclusions whose complexity exceeds j. Similarly, if
the proof in hand contains a deduced step that requires k distinct variables and all other
deduced steps require k or fewer—its variable richness is k—one can easily search for a
proof with strictly less richness by assigning a value less than k to max distinct vars.
Still in the context of proof simplification, OTTER offers the means for seeking a
proof that avoids the use of some thought-to-be-indispensable powerful lemma. One merely
instructs the program to reject if deduced the clause that corresponds to the unwanted
lemma, either through the use of demodulation or through the use of weighting. Ordinarily,
the absence of a powerful or deep lemma in a proof makes the proof simpler; indeed, one
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need not master the proof of the lemma. Essentially the same approach can be applied if
the refinement under consideration concerns some class of term that is to be avoided, for
example, double-negation terms or terms containing as a proper subexpression i(t, t) for
any term t and some function i. In the context of an application outside of mathematics or
logic, a circuit designer might wish to avoid nested not gates. Such term avoidance, though
often counterintuitive, can yield a simpler proof. Of course, simplification in one property
may be at the expense of simplification in another. For example, blocking the use of a
“big” lemma may result in a longer proof. On the other hand, as occurred in our study of
a dependency in infinite-valued sentential calculus, our methodologies applied by OTTER
yielded a proof free of three lemmas used in the literature, free of double negation, and
shorter than any proof of which we know, a proof of length 30 (applications of condensed
detachment).
At this point, we turn from details about methodology to a brisk review of diverse
successes. We also include open questions to stimulate further research.
3 Diverse Successes and Open Questions
This section offers a very small taste of what has been recently discovered with OTTER’s
assistance. Bulleted items offer research topics.
Group theory has witnessed significant contributions by automated reasoning. For the
first such citation, consider groups of exponent 19, groups in which the nineteenth power of
x (for all elements x) is the identity e. Such groups admit a single axiom, the following (in
which the function f denotes product).
(f(x,f(x,f(x,f(x,f(x,f(x,f(x,f(x,f(x,f(f(x,f(x,f(x,f(x,f(x,f(x,f(x,
f(x,f(x,f(f(x,y),z)))))))))),f(e,f(z,f(z,f(z,f(z,f(z,f(z,f(z,
f(z,f(z,f(z,f(z,f(z,f(z,f(z,f(z,f(z,f(z,z)))))))))))))))))))))))))))) = y).
There does exist a shortest single axiom (proved by Kunen and Hart) obtained by dropping
the occurrence of e [Hart1995].
As for groups in general, single axioms have been respectively contributed by McCune
[McCune1993] and by Kunen [Kunen1992], the first the shortest possible (proved by Kunen),
and the second that with the least variable richness. In the following, f denotes product,
and g denotes inverse.
f(x,g(f(y,f(f(f(z,g(z)),g(f(u,y))),x)))) = u.
f(g(f(x,g(x))),f(f(g(x),y),g(f(g(f(x,z)),y)))) = z.
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• Does there exist a single axiom whose length is that of the first cited, but whose
variable richness is that of the second (3)?
• Does there exist a short single axiom for groups of exponent 6, those such that the
sixth power of x is the identity for all elements x? Meredith has provided single
axioms for groups of exponent 2 [Meredith1968], and Kunen has provided shortest
single axioms for groups of exponent 4 [Kunen1995].
Lattice theory also has not escaped the consideration by OTTER in the context of
single axioms. Indeed, McCune has used this program to find the following 29-letter axiom,
where v denotes join and ^ denotes meet.
(((y v x)^x) v (((z^ (x v x)) v (u^x))^v))^ (w v ((v6 v x)^ (x v v7)))=x.
• Does there exist a shorter single axiom for lattice theory?
Boolean algebra also relinquished some of its treasures to OTTER. In particular,
prompted by an e-mail in which S. Wolfram offered 25 candidate equations for being a
single axiom, Veroff [Veroff2000] and McCune [McCune2001] conducted a study of that
field in terms of the Sheffer stroke. They proved two of the equations sufficient (including
the following in which the function f denotes the Sheffer stroke), proved that their mirror
images are also sufficient, and (with colleagues) that seven are insufficient; the status of the
remaining sixteen is still in doubt [McCune2001].
f(f(x,f(f(y,x),x)),f(y,f(z,x)))=y
McCune in a separate study of Boolean algebra in terms of or and not, denoted by + and
∼, respectively, found ten single axioms, including the following.
~ (~ (~ (x + y) + z) + ~ (x + ~ (~ z + ~ (z + u)))) = z
• Does there exist a shorter single axiom in terms of disjunction and negation? (Col-
leagues have shown that no shorter single axiom in terms of the Sheffer stroke exists.)
Various fields of logic have also been successfully mined with OTTER. The following
new single axiom (in terms of the Sheffer stroke) for propositional logic was found by B.
Fitelson.
P((D(D(x,D(y,z)),D(D(D(D(y,u),D(x,u)),D(u,y)),D(D(z,y),x))))).
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Fitelson then found the following and first known single axiom for C4 [Ernst2001].
P(i(i(x,i(i(y,i(z,z)),i(x,u))),i(i(u,v),i(w,i(x,v))))).
• Does there exist another single axiom for C4?
K. Harris then found a single axiom for the implicational fragment of infinite-valued
sentential calculus, the following.
P(i(i(i(x,i(y,x)),i(i(i(i(i(i(i(i(i(z,u),i(i(v,z),i(v,u))),i(i(w,i(v6,w)),
v7)),v7),i(i(i(i(v8,v9),v9),i(i(v9,v8),v8)),v10)),v10),i(i(i(i(v11,v12),
i(v12,v11)),i(v12,v11)),v13)),v13),i(i(v14,i(v15,v14)),v16))),v16)).
• Does there exist a shorter single axiom for this area of logic?
Of a strikingly different nature are successes and questions focusing on proof refinement,
pertinent to Hilbert’s interest in proof simplification. One interesting success concerns
Kunen’s shortest single axiom for groups (given earlier in this section). Relying on a Knuth-
Bendix approach and a corresponding input file supplied by Kunen, OTTER found a proof
of length 98, a proof that includes more than fifty applications of demodulation. Relying on
various methodologies designed to yield (if possible) shorter proofs, and replacing Knuth-
Bendix by a more standard use of paramodulation, OTTER eventually discovered a 43-step
proof, a proof totally free of demodulation.
• Does there exist a proof where the length is 42 or less?
Where diverse aspects of proof simplification are in focus, the Meredith single axiom
for two-valued sentential calculus provided the wellspring for various successes. His proof
is (in effect) of length 41. Our research has produced a 38-step proof.
• Does there exist a shorter proof?
The Meredith proof has variable richness seven. We have found a proof of richness five,
which is the limiting case; that proof has length 68. The Meredith proof relies on the use
of double negation, containing seventeen steps of that type. We have discovered a proof
totally free of double negation, a proof of length 51.
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4 Summary and Invitation
The nature of research has changed. Now one can choose to have the assistance of a powerful,
general-purpose automated reasoning program. OTTER, for example, offers a wide variety
of strategies that enable the researcher to explore huge spaces of conclusions and traverse
within that space areas that would be otherwise quite difficult, even counterintuitive, to
explore. One can use a reasoning program to find first proofs and settle conjectures. Instead,
one can enlist its assistance in proof simplification of diverse types (in the spirit of Hilbert’s
twenty-fourth problem).
An appealing aspect of the Hilbert-style, axiomatic proofs discovered by OTTER is the
detail that is supplied. Such proofs admit automated checking in most cases. A researcher
can learn from such proofs, and, as if some graduate student or colleague had provided the
results of incomplete research, one can also learn from incomplete attempts by examining
the conclusions that were drawn by the program in the attempt and placed in an output
file. Surprises occur. For example, occasionally one finds that a thought-to-be-indispensable
lemma is in fact not needed.
We invite suggestions in the realm of open questions where no proof exists or those
focusing on some type of proof simplification. The sampling we have presented in this article
provides a clue concerning the nature of question that we have in mind. Such questions or,
for that matter, comment is welcome by surface mail or by e-mail, wos@mcs.anl.gov.
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